Agents is the environment registry of AI agents and other non-human identities that call your APIs and MCP servers. Open it from the sidebar (/dashboard/agents). The console subtitle is "Register, authorize, and audit the AI agents and machine identities calling your APIs and MCP servers".
Agents is sales-gated (feature slug agents). Until access is approved, the page shows a locked landing — "Register and govern the machines that call your APIs" — with Request access. That landing is not a tab. After approval, the default tab is Agents. How to request: Support.
Per environment. A selected project and environment are required. Creating an agent in dev does not register it in prod.
This is not a new project type. It sits on top of the environment's trust store: each row is a verified subject (usually an OIDC client ID, a SPIFFE ID, or a URI) with scoped tools, keys, and a revoke switch. For when to use an Agents entry versus an M2M project or a service account, see Machine identity.
Agents
The Agents tab is the default. It lists trust-store entries. The Agents filter shows identityType=agent only; All identities also shows mcp_server and workload rows.
| Control | Details |
|---|---|
| New agent | Opens the register wizard. |
| Verify | Marks an unverified row verified (manual_console). |
| Revoke | Issuer-side kill switch when the subject is the OIDC client_id: new tokens fail. SPIFFE / URI subjects are registry + AuthZEN only. Outstanding JWTs last until expires_in unless the resource server runs trust-store enforce. |
| Delete | Removes the entry. Prefer revoke if you may need the record. |
Empty: "No agents registered yet in this environment." with Register your first agent.
Register an identity
The wizard starts with two cards:
| Mode | What it does |
|---|---|
| Create new agent identity | Provisions an OIDC client (client_credentials, optional RFC 8693 token-exchange and identity assertions), then registers a trust-store entry whose subject is the new client ID. The client secret is shown once. |
| Register existing identity | Registers a subject that already authenticates elsewhere: an existing client ID, a spiffe:// ID, or a URI. |
Both modes set a name, optional description, allowed scopes, and allowed tools (globs; * means all tools). You can verify immediately.
Click a row to open the detail sheet: name, description, active flag, allowed scopes and tools, keys (key-challenge or SPIFFE JWT-SVID verify; bearer tokens still use the environment JWKS), manifest pin (SHA-256 of the expected tool list; Lidar mcp_rug_pull fires when a live tools/list drifts), and Delegation (grant / revoke RFC 8693 token-exchange; nested act chain; never impersonation; optional identity-assertion grant).
Activity
The Activity tab is the environment audit for MCP runtime (mcp_runtime): tool invoked, denied, failed, auth denied, and trust violation. Filter by subject. Open Activity from an agent's detail sheet and the list is already filtered to that subject.
Origins
The Origins tab is a fail-closed allowlist of audience URLs that may appear as aud on an identity assertion. An empty list means the grant mints nothing. Origins validate via /.well-known/authdog-identity-assertion (issuer, JWKS, 60s lifetime, no refresh). Device authorization is not part of this slice.
Related
| Read | To learn how to |
|---|---|
| AgentSec | The umbrella: agent authentication + access control |
| Agent Sign-In | Agents signing into your app with a revocable identity |
| Agent frameworks | Put the agent bearer on A2A, Eve, MCP, LangGraph, or the OpenAI Agents SDK |
| Agents quickstart | Token exchange after access is approved |
| Support | Request access to the gated Agents module |
| Machine identity | Pick M2M, Agents, service account, or PAT |
| MCP servers | Front an MCP server and test in the playground |
| Authorization | Scope what an agent may do after it authenticates |
| Lidar | Detect tool abuse, injection, and rug-pulls |
| Audit | Broader event trail beyond mcp_runtime |